There is a problem with Grice’s theory of a “cooperative principle”, possibly like the problem with general theories of syntax. The problem may be that conversations (like syntax) are not so uniform as to be describable with one particular theory. The possibilities for conversations may be innumerable. The principles of conversations may be as numerous as conversations themselves. Divergent goals, divergent styles, expression of personality, and poetics, are among the possible reasons.
The same problem would hold for Grice’s maxims (under four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, Manner.) Is, in fact, Grice describing the ideal conversation of university professors (Quality, for example, demands truth and evidence)? Grice finally clarifies that he assumes that the purpose of a conversation (or, “talk exchange”) is the “maximally effective exchange of information”. He also recognizes that this is not generally true of all conversations, which may have other purposes, e.g. “influencing or directing the actions of others” (47).
What is the empirical evidence for the cooperative principle being followed generally at all (outside of e.g. Oxford University conversations experienced personally by Grice)? Noteworthy forms of dodging an empirical requirement are displayed (pp. 48-9):
(a) asserting that it is already proven: “it is just a well recognized empirical fact that people DO behave in these ways”.
(b) asserting that it is universally rational: “it is much easier… to tell the truth than to invent lies.” (Really?)
(c) demonstrating in part that the cooperative principle is rational (here assuming that all or most people are rational. (Then could this be a theory of heavenly conversations?)).
The leap to conversational implicature is no less risky. This is indicated by Grice's faulty analysis (p. 43) of the imaginary conversation between A and B about C: a unique implication of C’s potential dishonesty is not certain; instead, the implication could be
banking is tempting for all people;
that bank’s personnel are wicked (and would try to frame or entrap C in a crime);
that bank is wicked (ditto);
all banks are wicked (ditto).
The example of A and B planning travel is similarly analyzed faultily: there are many other possible implicatures. The potentiality of many implicatures from one utterance also opens for the possibility that the speaker intends several or all of them. Indeed, so thought Tolkein (a contemporary Oxford professor, whose work also concerned languages).
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Tolkien’s meditation on implicature:
"Good morning!" said Bilbo, and he meant it. The sun was shining, and the grass was very green. But Gandalf looked at him from under long bushy eyebrows that stuck out farther than the brim of his shady hat.
"What do you mean?" he said. "Do you wish me a good morning, or mean that it is a good morning whether I want it or not; or that you feel good this morning; or that it is a morning to be good on?"
"All of them at once," said Bilbo.
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Conversation among people may be far more complex, humane, open, than Grice theorized. (Elite English conversation may be highly limited, seeking primarily (a) preservation of social status, (b) exhibition of awareness of elaborate and elite social rules, e.g. culturally specific conversational principles. If the elite masqueraded as the ideal, that could have misled Grice into thinking it was a universal ideal and the perfection of rationality.)
This seems to be anticipated and described in the “post-Gricean” emphasis on context (cf. Katarzyna Jaszczolt, 2007, “On being post-Gricean”, in: R. A. Nilsen, N. A. A. Amfo and K. Borthen (eds). Interpreting Utterances: Pragmatics and Its Interfaces. Oslo: Novus. 21-38. Link to webpage where Jaszczolt’s articles are available to read).
