From the brief study, "A Christian reflexion on Pragmatics"... where we introduce the hypothesis that competitive communication must be considered on a par with cooperative communication (pace Grice, Levinson, Huang, etc.):
...how often is conversation actually (and even rationally) competitive
rather than cooperative? And how dire are the consequences if one party
communicates cooperatively in such a situation? The example of courtrooms as a
non-cooperative situation, often cited in the literature, is surely
inexhaustive. If in fact much language use is actually (even rationally)
competitive, what are the consequences for the speaker or hearer who naively
follows the Gricean cooperative programme? Quite certainly she will be duped
and abused and soon adopt another programme, likely with other divisions and
rules of inference. Now where is this actual (and likely rational) language use
described? Is it a corollary of cooperative use?
Grice’s programme runs the risk of leading people to believe falsely that
cooperation is normal (by dint largely of assertion, as we will show),
rendering them servile, vulnerable, even morally inert or worse (if they are
led to cooperate with a morally repugnant agent).
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